1940 was a successful year for Nazi Germany in terms of its foreign policy. The blitzkrieg tactic employed in the invasion of Western Europe allowed the Nazis to invade and occupy a number of territories including France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.[1] With their enemies defeated and with Britain on the retreat after the evacuation at Dunkirk, the Nazi leadership believed they were ready to attack their current ally in the east. In December 1940, Operation Barbarossa was issued to the Wehrmacht leadership ordering them to prepare for an offensive war against the Soviet Union the subsequent year.[2] The operation proceeded on 22 June 1941 and, similar to the invasion of the west, saw a number of eastern European countries fall under the occupation of the Nazis. Among these countries were Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia who all fell under Nazi rule by early July.

The events that occurred during the German occupation of the Baltic States were scarcely covered in historiography until the early 1990s, and there are two main reasons for this. The first is that prior to this period, primary documents were unavailable on many aspects of the German occupation of the Soviet Union. The second is that the Cold War made it difficult for meaningful discussion on collaboration to occur. However, after the downfall of the Soviet Union, the practice of history, and those who practised it, was transformed in the Baltic States. Many historians of the older generation retired and were replaced by younger historians who were interested in pursuing the practice of ‘western’ history writing.[3] There was also an increase in interest from outside these states with international historians now being able to accurately research, analyse and debate the period due to an access to new materials.

The research that has occurred over the past thirty years has highlighted many issues regarding the German occupation and a number of them continue to prompt discussions amongst historians to this day. The discussion of these issues will be the main subject of this essay as it aims to analyse what has been written on the collaboration between the Nazis and the Baltic populations in terms of the German perspective. However, while a large number of works have been published in English, or have been translated into English, a significant proportion of the historiography has only been published in either Lithuanian, Latvian or Estonian. Although I have had success in using online translation tools for some of these works, for others it has proven too difficult. For this reason, this essay primarily intends to analyse the English language literature on the topic. Almost all of the discussion that appears within the English language historiography can be grouped into five subjects. These include the administration imposed, the Nazi war effort, the Final Solution, Generalplan Ost (GPO) and the ethnic tensions within the Baltic States. By analysing these subjects this essay will be able to comprehensively examine the current state of historiography.

In order to understand the issues related to the Nazi occupation of the Baltic States, one must first understand what they wished to achieve in collaborating with the local populations. In the short term, collaboration was focused on increasing Germany’s war capacity by exploiting the natural resources of the states, whilst also implementing a Final Solution that would rid these countries of their supposed ‘undesirables’.[4] In the long term, the Germans saw the implementation of their Generalplan Ost which foresaw the colonisation of the Baltic States and the exportation of the majority of the local populations further east.[5]

The Nazi leadership knew that if they wished to achieve their aims, they would need to create and establish an occupying administration. As outlined by Björn Felder, it was decided that the states of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and White Russia would be grouped under the administrative jurisdiction of Reichskommissariat Ostland which would be headed by Heinrich Lohse under the supervision of Alfred Rosenberg. [6] However, to the leadership’s dismay, the established administration experienced a number of issues that hindered the leadership’s ability to efficiently implement their plans. These issues primarily relate to the tensions in relationships between the Germans and the collaborating Balts, as well as tensions in inter-German relations. Accordingly, some historians have taken it upon themselves to discuss these issues in relations, along with what led them to occur, in order to create a better understanding of the administration’s ultimate failings.

From all of the research undertaken for this essay, only three historians have been found to discuss the inter-German relationship issues. Prit Buttar is one such historian who has addressed the topic and argues that it was due to a lack of planning that Nazis’ problems were intensified.[7] This lack of planning subsequently led to an ambiguous power structure amongst the administrative authorities. He states that four groups competed for power at the Reichskommissariat’s headquarters in Riga including the Wehrmacht, the German military intelligence service (Abwehr), Göring’s economic administration and the Sicherdienst (SD), the intelligence agency of the Schutzstaffel (SS).[8] Buttar explains that this lack of structure ensured that each agency pursued its own agenda, except in cases that involved the persecution of Communists and Jews.[9]

Andrejs Plakans, an expert on Latvian history, is another who writes on the topic. He agrees with Buttar that a lack of structure created issues amongst the German authorities.[10] However, unlike Buttar, Plakans’ study explains which authority was warring with another. He states that the Wehrmacht were frequently at odds with the SS about whether internal security or wartime needs were paramount.[11] The SS and the SD were single-minded on their plans for the Baltic States: the extermination of its ‘undesirables’. Plakans adds that on a district and sub-district level, commissars were constantly clashing about overlapping jurisdictions. An impressive part of Plakans’ work is that he highlights the weaknesses of Rosenberg as an administrator. He claims that Rosenberg was an untalented bureaucrat whose lack of leadership allowed his subordinates to undermine his authority and pursue their individual ideals.[12]  Julius Slavenas also emphasizes the failures of Rosenberg. He states that while Rosenberg was the official boss in Eastern Europe, it was actually Lohse who ran Ostland and he did so according to his own judgement.[13] Overall, one can see that these three historians are trying to convey a similar message, that a lack of structure and leadership lead to an inefficient administration.

Unsurprisingly, those historians who have looked at inter-German relations also discuss German-Baltic relations as the former certainly had implications on the latter. For example, Buttar explains that in October 1941 the Pērkonkrusts, a Latvian nationalist organisation, were banned from expressing their nationalist views as this was contrary to Generalplan Ost which foresaw Latvia as a future colony. However, members of the SD continued to protect and foster their Pērkonkrust members as they saw Latvian help in Baltic security as more important when compared to the GPO.[14] As well as showing a distinct lack of agreement amongst the occupying authorities, this example shows how inter-German relations could cause friction in German-Baltic relations.

The frictions in German-Baltic relations were ever present throughout the occupation. Factors such as a lack of trust between the German and the Balts, and the treatment of the Balts are those most referenced in historiography for causing such tensions. There are numerous examples of this lack of trust. Inesis Feldmanis explains that although the Latvian Self-Administration of the Land established in March 1942 was an executive authority, it was given only limited powers.[15] There was also suspicion surrounding the sudden death of Latvian commander Colonel Rudolph Kandis in May 1942. The Germans claimed he committed suicide, however, many Latvians believed he was shot by a German officer.[16] The power of the Lithuanian provisional government was also being undermined by the Germans. The Germans did all they could to disrupt the development of the provisional government including censoring the press and obstructing the Kaunas radio.[17]

The treatment of Balts as second class citizens is also addressed. Buttar explains that Germans alienated the locals by renaming roads to Nazi leaders’ names and by Germanising the education system. Rations were also half of what the civilian population received in the Reich.[18] The resulting consequences of such treatment are outlined by Slavenas who emphasises that because the Germans displayed an attitude of superiority amongst the locals they created a number of enemies. Importantly, he argues that had the Germans pursued friendly policies toward the natives in the Baltic States, they might have capitalised on anti-communist sentiments.[19] In terms of an overall observation of this historiography, it is evident that there is a lack of work discussing the Estonian-German relations. It also somewhat alarming that only a select few have chosen to look at the German administration in the Baltic States as a whole, and that a significantly in depth study on the topic has yet to take place.

As outlined by Heinrich Lohse, one of the main objectives in Ostland was to establish an economy that emphasised immediate war needs.[20] Successfully exploiting the area for its natural resources, labour force, and eventually its soldiers, would be crucial if the Nazis were to be victorious in a long war. These three elements of the exploitation have, therefore, become those discussed in historiography with each receiving differing levels of attention. While a number of historians briefly mention the exploitation of natural resources, only a few describe the Nazis’ policy in any detail. Feldmanis is one such historian who explains that minerals and timber were shipped to Germany in substantial quantities, and that a large number of foods were requisitioned for the German army.[21] For exact quantities one must cite the works of economic historians. However, these works are scarce, and there appear to be none published in English that look at the Baltic States as a whole. An example of a native work is Arnolds Aizsilnieks’ History of Latvian Economy. In this he explains that the Nazi occupation reaped 660 million USD worth of natural resources from Latvia based on the prices of 1940.[22]

The level of research and discussion undertaken regarding the exportation of labour forces is similar. Again, many historians touch on the subject, but only a select few provide more than a sentence on the subject. Ülle Kraft devotes a small section of his work to the labour service. He explains that in February 1943, Germany began to enlist men born between 1919 and 1924 into the labour service, for use as workers back in the Fatherland.[23] With reference to Oskar Angelus’ work from 1956, Kraft identifies that the Nazi labour recruitment policy involved a significant amount of coercion rather than volunteering.[24] The only statistic in the historiography showing the number of Estonians deported to be labourers can be find in Toivo Raun’s work. He states that 50,000 Estonians were lost to war mobilisation and labour deportations, which is somewhat unspecific.[25] However, the numbers are complete for Lithuania and Latvia. Aldis Purs writes that 35,000 Latvians were exported as German labourers.[26] He also describes how the director of the Latvian Self-Administration, Oskar Dankers, was persuaded by the Nazis to help convince Latvians to work for the German cause. For Lithuania, Thomas Lane explains that approximately 36,000 Lithuanians were deported to Germany as slave labour.[27] From surveying the historiography on the Nazi policy with regards to the labour service, one can see that there are areas that need supplemented. For Estonia, it’s figuring out the number of workers exported to the Reich. For the Baltic States, it would be beneficial to see more research on the other ways in which the Nazis recruited Balts for labour service.

When looking at works that discuss the Nazi war effort in the Baltic States one can see that an overwhelming proportion of historiography focuses on the Nazi recruitment of security policemen and SS soldiers. The methods of recruitment and the motivations behind the formation of both the security police battalions and the SS divisions have become two of the main topics of discussion when it comes to Nazi policy. In the case of the both Sicherheits Polizei and the SS divisions, the methods of recruitment have both similarities and differences in each state. In all states, it would appear that the Nazis used the nationalist desires of the Baltic peoples as a bargaining tool. In exchange for some form of national autonomy, Baltic nationalists sought to offer men for the fight against the Soviets. The Slovak State, which was a semi-independent protectorate was often held as the desired model.[28] Some historians such as Aldis Purs and Artis Pabriks argue that this misguided patriotism would never bring Latvian national autonomy. They state that this was ‘pure fantasy’, however, whether this was the case has been discussed in historiography.[29] Buttar and Slavenas make the point that, for reasons of expediency, Heinrich Himmler and Alfred Rosenberg became advocates of providing the Baltic States some degree of national autonomy. To the dismay of the Balts, Adolf Hitler refused to back any such decision.[30] Although the nationalistic desires of the Balts failed to materialise, one can argue that their hopes were not entirely fallacious.

Similar to Nazi policy in recruiting labour, historians tend to agree that there was a mixture of coercion and volunteering in the recruitment of both the security police and the SS soldiers. However, unlike in Estonia and Lithuania, historians dispute the weighting of coercion to volunteering in Latvia. Purs and Pabriks argue a heavily coercive case for the recruitment of the security police. They state that there was nothing voluntary about the conscription imposed on the Latvians, and that leaving the police battalions was a not a common option for policemen.[31] On the other hand, Kārlis Kangeris, with reference to a report from the time, states that the Latvian police battalions were but ‘mercenaries, who work for pay’.[32] In Lithuania, the history of their police battalions has not yet been closely and objectively examined.[33] In addition to this, the Nazis failed to establish an SS legion in Lithuania, so one can understand why there are almost no materials discussing the weighting of coercion to volunteering.[34] In Estonia, a primary source from Ülle Kraft shows that while the Nazis did impose coercive methods, some did volunteer for service. He explains that Estonian men had to participate in the fight against Bolshevism either with their work or with their weapons as in October 1943, all men born before 1925 were conscripted for military service. They could either enrol in the labour service and ‘dig ditches for the Germans!’ as put by Estonian ex-serviceman Harri Rent, or enrol in the Estonian SS Legion and go to the front ‘with a machine gun!’.[35] Legionaries were also given special perks such as modern equipment, the opportunity to undergo training in German schools and equal pay to that of German legionaries. One can therefore see that Estonians did normally have a choice to enrol in the SS legion, and that some of the 10,000 men who enrolled may have done as a result of the enticements offered by the Nazis.

The other short-term priority of the Nazis in their occupation of the Baltic States was the implementation of the Final Solution. While the Holocaust played out differently in each country, the historiography shows that there were similarities in the implementation of Nazi policy. It would appear that there is a consensus amongst historians that the use of propaganda as a recruitment tool was a policy that the Nazis implemented in each state. One of the most heavily pushed messages by the Germans was the idea of Bolshevism equating to Judaism. Lane explains that in Lithuania they played on the fact that the Lithuanian Communist Party was disproportionately composed of Jews and that Jewish members of the NKVD participated in the Sovietization of Lithuania during the Soviet occupation.[36] Alfred Senn argues the same case for Latvia explaining that the relatively favourable treatment of Jews under the first Soviet occupation, taken in conjunction with the oppression and deportation of Latvians, was utilised by the Nazis to help induce an explosion of violence against the Jews in the country.[37] Meanwhile, Ruth Bettina-Birn states that the Germans propagated a similar message in Estonia and that it received support amongst the locals as they wished to exterminate all of their political enemies.[38] Other historians appear to follow the same if not a similar argument and so one may conclude that the issue has been settled within the historiography.

A further Nazi policy that has been shown to be implemented in each Baltic state was making the Holocaust appear as a local enterprise.[39] However, this policy has created a two-sided debate between historians. On the one side, some historians argue that this policy need not be implemented as the initial phase of the Holocaust in Lithuania and Latvia was essentially a local enterprise. For example, Buttar explains that as soon as the invasion of Lithuania began so too did the execution of Jews, and so it is likely that the Baltic pogroms were primarily locally driven.[40] Plakans concurs stating that the German approach to make it appear that the local population were initiators in the Holocaust was an unnecessary pretext.[41] On the other side, some argue that the initial pogroms were overwhelmingly influenced by German politics. For example, Timothy Snyder states that the previous argument is a popular way to explain the Holocaust without German politics: as a historically predictable outburst of the barbarity of east Europeans. He adds that the message conveyed to the Einsatzgruppen commanders was to create the appearance of local spontaneity, which suggests that the reality was absent.[42]

As already stated, the Holocaust played out differently in each Baltic state and this is due, in part, to differences in Nazi policy. Anton Weiss-Wendt explains that unlike in Latvia and Lithuania, there were no anti-Jewish pogroms or Jewish ghettos in Estonia.[43] One explanation for the lack of ghettos is related to the fact that less than one thousand Jews inhabited Estonia. The Nazis therefore realised that they could easily exterminate the Estonian Jews alongside any other political enemies without the need to establish any ghettos. While also saving resources, this policy would help shelter the less extreme citizens from the atrocities that were occurring in the country. Therefore, one can see that Nazi policy did influence how the Holocaust played out in Estonia. However, in terms of the lack of pogroms, it is more difficult to understand the role of Nazi policy. As already shown, Snyder is one historian who argues that the pogroms in Latvia and Lithuania were induced by the Nazis. In terms of Estonia, Snyder justifies the lack of pogroms by arguing that by the time the Nazis had invaded, they had realised that pogroms had were longer an effective recruitment tool. Instead they now believed that the most effective recruitment method was to explain to the Estonians that local participation in liberation from the Jews was a prerequisite to any political negotiations.[44] However, the issue with Snyder’s argument is that it rests on the idea that the pogroms were simply a recruitment tool of the Nazis. Whether this is the case is difficult to determine, but it is known that some historians disagree with Snyder. For example, Prit Buttar references a Lithuanian farmer who stated a few weeks before invasion that, ‘the Germans only have to cross the border, and on the same day we will wade in the blood of Jews in Plungė’.[45] This could suggest that strong feelings of anti-Semitism were present in areas of the Baltic states, and that the anti-Jewish pogroms that broke out may have been linked more closely to this anti-Semitism than Nazi policy.

A long-term plan of the Nazis was the implementation of the Generalplan Ost. This plan appears in almost every work that discusses Nazi policy in the Baltic States, however, almost every work appears to only provide a narrative on the subject. Like in other eastern European states, Generalplan Ost foresaw both the colonisation of the Baltic States as well as a substantial number of their peoples to face deportations further east.[46] However, unlike these other countries, the number of deportees were far lower as the Nazis intended to allow around fifty percent of Estonians, fifteen percent of Latvians and fifteen percent of Lithuanians to stay in the Baltic States.[47] The Germans deemed these Balts to be racially superior to their compatriots.[48]

In terms of colonisation, the Baltic States were to be primarily inhabited by Germans, Danes and Dutch with the goal being to Germanize the states within one or two generations. As understood from the historiography, colonisation began during the middle period of the occupation. By the end of 1943, around 50,000 German colonists, as well as Dutch and Danes were settled in Lithuania.[49] Just like the statistic showing the number of colonists in Latvia and Estonia, no real discussion regarding Generalplan Ost appears in the English language historiography. A solitary example can be found in Buttar’s work where he explains that the failure of the plan to allow any degree of self-government in the Baltic states resulted in a failure to take advantage of the anti-Soviet attitude that was harboured by the populations of these countries. He adds further that this failure could be regarded as the main factor in determining the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front, and therefore the Second World War.[50] It is surprising that such a substantial claim be made, yet no discussion has appeared to either challenge or concur with it. This could be because everyone who has read it agrees with the statement and feels no need to comment on it. However, it is more likely that historians who cover Nazi policy in the Baltic States haven’t yet to take Generalplan Ost into consideration, or believe that it is nowhere near as important as Buttar makes out. If the latter is the case, one would hope that these historians would show their argument. Hence, in terms of the historiography on Generalplan Ost in the Baltic States, more research and discussion could take place to explain its impact.

When the Nazis invaded the Baltic states in June 1941, they invaded countries with multiple ethnic groups. These groups included ethnic Jews, Germans, Russians and, of course, Balts. Over the course of the invasion, ethnic tensions were at extremely high levels as different groups collided with each other resulting in positive and negatives consequences for the Nazis. Surprisingly, however, the historiography on the Nazi occupation does not appear to address the importance of ethnic tensions in causing these issues. In order to understand the ethnic tensions in the post invasion period one must first understand the inter-ethnic relations in the decades building up to the occupation, and to the credit of the historiography a couple of historians explain this. Anton Weiss-Wendt gives a detailed understanding of the relations in Estonia. There was a fear amongst ethnic Estonians that there was an impeding danger of Germanisation and or Russification. This was highlighted in Estonian literature which emphasized the high birth rates of ethnic Russians during the interwar period as well as the expansionist desires of the Nazis.[51] Weiss-Wendt also explains that the Estonian Eugenics Society Healthy Breeding program held the Convention of National Upbringing in 1927 and 1935, which discussed issues such as race, fertility, and society. The program identified the so called inferior racial elements among Estonian society and concluded that they made up one third of the total population.[52] As we know, by 1941 the Estonians were involved in eradicating their political enemies including ethnic Jews and ethnic Russians. One can therefore argue the effect that ethnic tensions had on the Nazi occupation, that they ultimately helped fuel the political exterminations and the eventual formation of the Estonian SS Legion.

In Latvia, according to Björn Felder, many Latvian scholars from the early 1920s onwards made the claim that Latvians had Nordic heritage. An example was Teodors Upners, who used the term Aryan for Latvians, and also claimed that he feared ‘degeneration’ caused by mixing with ‘inferior races’.[53] Felder also talks about the eventual lectures that were put on by the nationalist group the Pērkonkrusts. In July and August 1941, the group discussed subjects such as ‘the Jewish Question’, ‘Marxism’ and ‘Race’.[54] What is interesting is that a number of the lecturers were founding members of the Pērkonkrusts when it was established in 1932. This would suggest that these anti-Semitic and anti-Russian ideologies may have been present in some areas Latvian society throughout the 1930s. He makes another point that compliments his argument which is that during this same period the University of Latvia tried to publish a journal showing the benefits of racial purity called Tautietis (Fellow Countrymen).[55] Anti-German feelings were also ever present according to Timothy Snyder. He states that one of the main ethnic conflicts in Latvia was between the Latvians and the Germans.[56] While this is likely to be true, as they probably feared for their nation’s continued autonomy, Snyder does not appear to provide any clear explanation for his statement in the pages prior or following it. Overall then, one can again argue the prominent role that ethnic tensions played in the occupation of the Baltic States while further seeing the effect that this was having on Nazi policy in the region. The effect in this case was again mainly positive for the Nazis, as the divided society made gaining control of the country less difficult.

In conclusion, the English language historiography on Nazi policy in the occupied Baltic states has made for interesting reading. As already stated, this historiography has focused on five issues and it is clear which of these issues have been researched to a greater or lesser extent. The administration that was implemented by the Germans has received an unduly lack of attention. I have said unduly as I believe that when looking at the Baltic occupation from a German perspective, the historiography has tended to overlook the importance of the administration in the future successes and failures of the occupation. The lack of a clear plan, cohesive relationships and authoritative hierarchy arguably doomed the occupation before the invasion had begun. In terms of the policies regarding economic exploitation of the Balts, the majority of historians have emphasised the recruitment of Baltic men into security police and then eventually the SS. This is somewhat understandable as it was these two sets of men that the Nazis required to implement their Final Solution and increase their chances of a victory against the Russians. These groups also made up the majority of the number of Balts involved in the Nazi occupation, so one can see a potential reason for the overwhelming attention. However, the exploitation of natural resources and the recruitment of a labour force were important factors in building a thriving war economy for the Germans. Considering that a number of new works in the historiography discussing the Eastern front of the Second World War have placed a significant emphasis on the importance of food, oil and labour in changing the outcome of the war, one would expect that the historiography discussing the Baltic occupation would start to show the same.[57]

The implementation of the Final Solution in Baltic States is a subject that is thoroughly addressed in secondary literature. While Nazi policy extends to more than what is discussed in this essay, the chosen issues are those appear to be the most important or most contentious. There is an obvious divide on the importance of the Nazis in inducing the pogroms and so if we are to create a better understanding of this issue, additional research must take place. The discussion of Generalplan Ost, on the other hand, is limited. As already stated, the majority of the historiography is primarily narrative, added in to simply show that the topic has been mentioned. I believe that historiography could benefit from a more detailed explanation of how the Nazis were beginning to colonise the Baltic States in order to create a better understanding of the occupation. When addressing the topic of ethnic tensions one can see a lack of discussion in certain areas. To the dismay of historiography, there appear to be no works in the English language that discuss the ethnic relations in Lithuania. Furthermore, there appears to be no direct discussion of the implications that the differing religious ideologies of the different Baltic countries had on ethnic relations. I believe that more research into this part of the topic would be beneficial to the overall historiography.

A final point that should be addressed is the difficulty in surveying the historiography on Nazi policy in the Baltic States. Language barriers have, and most likely always will, make it difficult for this type of essay to show the full extent of the historiography. As stated this essay has attempted to counter this by using online translation tools. Unfortunately, this is not always an option or entirely accurate. Another prominent issue is that of access. The cost of certain works is sometimes too expensive as memberships are required to be paid or physical copies are lacking. However, this essay has attempted to fully survey the majority of the historiography in order to create an understanding of the current state of knowledge and discussion on the topic.

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[1] G. Watkins, ‘Review: The Fall of France: The Nazi invasion of 1940’, French History 19 (2005), 409.

[2] Directive No. 21 Operation Barbarossa (18 December 1940)

[3] A. Plakans, ‘The Commission of Historians in Latvia: 1999 to the Present’, Journal of Baltic Studies, 49 (2014), 89.

[4] I. Feldmanis, ‘Latvia under the Occupation of National Socialist Germany 1941–1945’ in V. Nollendorfs V. and E. Oberlander (ed.) The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations 1940-1991 (Riga, 2005), 77.

[5] T. Lane, Lithuania: Stepping Westward (New York, 2001), 54.

[6] B. M. Felder, ‘“Euthanasia,” Human Experiments, and Psychiatry in Nazi-Occupied Lithuania, 1941–1944’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 27 (2013), 247.

[7] P. Buttar, Between Giants: The Battle for the Baltics in World War II (New York, 2015), 133.

[8] Ibid, 136.

[9] Ibid, 133.

[10] A. Plakans, A Concise History of the Baltic States (Cambridge 2011), 351.

[11] Ibid, 352.

[12] Ibid, 351.

[13] J. Slavenas, ‘Nazi Ideology and Policy in the Baltic States’, Lithuanian Quarterly Journal of Arts and Sciences, 11 (1965) http://www.lituanus.org/1965/65_1_03_Slavenas.html (accessed 24 October 2019)

[14] Buttar, Between Giants, 137.

[15] Feldmanis, ‘Latvia under the Occupation’, 77.

[16] Buttar, Between Giants, 143.

[17] Ibid, 134.

[18] Ibid, 137.

[19] Slavenas, ‘Nazi Ideology’.

[20] Heinrich Lohse, ‘Ostland baut auf’, Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, 142, (1942), 34.

[21] Feldmanis, ‘Latvia under the Occupation’, 77.

[22] A Aizsilnieks, Latvijas saimniecības vēsture 1914–1945 (Stockholm, 1968), 855.

[23] A. Bubnys, M. Kott and Ü Kraft, ‘The Baltic States: auxillaries and Waffen-SS soldiers from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’ in J. Böhler and R. Gerwarth (ed.), The Waffen-SS: A European History (Oxford, 2016), 147.

[24] O. Angelus, Tuhande valitseja maa: mälestusi Saksa okupatsiooni ajast, 1941–1944 (Stockholm, 1956), 61.

[25]  T. U. Raun, Estonia and the Estonians, (Stanford, 2001), 165.

[26] A. Pabriks and A. Purs, Latvia: The Challenges of Change (London, 2001), 28.

[27] Lane, Lithuania, 58.

[28] Bubnys, Kott and Kraft, ‘The Baltic States’, 124.

[29] Pabriks and Purs, Latvia, 30.

[30] Buttar, Between Giants, 144.

[31] Pabriks and Purs, Latvia, 29.

[32] Feldmanis, ‘Latvia under the Occupation’, 84.

[33] Bubnys, Kott and Kraft, ‘The Baltic States’, 124.

[34] Lane, Lithuania, 57.

[35] Bubnys, Kott and Kraft, ‘The Baltic States’, 147.

[36] Lane, Lithuania, 56.

[37] A. E. Senn, ‘Baltic Background’ in V. Nollendorfs V. and E. Oberlander (ed.) The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations 1940-1991 (Riga, 2005), 26.

[38] R. Bettina Birn, ‘Collaboration with Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe: The Case of the Estonian Security Police’, Contemporary European History, 10 (2001), 189.

[39] Nollendorfs, V. and Oberlander, E. (eds), The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations I940-I99I: Selected Research of the Commission of the Historians of Latvia (Riga, 2005), 13.

[40] Buttar, Between Giants, 142.

[41] Plakans, Concise, 352.

[42] T. Snyder, Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning (London, 2015), 149.

[43] A. Weiss-Wendt, Why the Holocaust Does Not Matter to Estonians’, Journal of Baltic Studies, 39 (2008), 477.

[44] Snyder, Black Earth, 214.

[45] Buttar, Between Giants, 104.

[46] H. Strods, Zem melnbrūnā zobena: Vācijas politika Latvijā 1939–1945 (Riga, 1994), 56.

[47] Lane, Lithuania, 54.

[48] Bubnys, Kott and Kraft, ‘The Baltic States’, 122.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Buttar, Between Giants, 137.

[51] A. Weiss Wendt, ‘Building Hitler’s “New Europe”: Ethonography and Racial Research in Nazi-Occupied Estonia’, in A. Weiss-Wendt and R. Yeomans (ed.) Racial Science in Hitler’s New Europe, 1938-1945 (Lincoln, 2013), 289.

[52] Ibid, 291.

[53] B. M. Felder, In Pursuit of Biological Purity Eugenics and Racial Paradigms in Nazi Occupied Latvia, 1941–1945’, in A. Weiss-Wendt and R. Yeomans (ed.) Racial Science in Hitler’s New Europe, 1938-1945 (Lincoln, 2013), 321.

[54] Ibid, 330.

[55] Ibid, 332.

[56] Snyder, Black Earth, 140.

[57] G. Gerhard, Nazi Hunger Politics: A History of Food in the Third Reich (Lanham, 2015)