Over the course of history, humans have constantly been involved in conflict with one another. Whether this be on a small or large scale, these encounters of violence seldom fail to attract the attention of historians. A prime example is the history of genocide which discusses possibly the worst act of violence that humans can commit. From 1941 to 1945, the world’s largest ever genocide took place across Eastern Europe. During this period approximately six million Jews lost their lives at the hands of the Nazi leadership and their subordinates. This distressing number of deaths and the nature in which they occurred have led to the Holocaust, as it is referred to as, becoming one of the most documented events in history.
While historians have continually researched, analysed and discussed almost every aspect of the Holocaust since its culmination, some aspects of the atrocity have only recently been discussed in historiography. Due to the Cold War and other related issues, it is only within the last thirty years that the Holocaust in the Baltic States has started to be thoroughly researched by historians. The narrative of the German occupation is an area that appears to have been fully covered during the last few decades. From the summer of 1941 to September 1944, the Baltic States were occupied by the Nazis and their peoples were forced to live under their rule. For ethnic Jews, this had dire consequences and ultimately resulted in the execution of more than 245,000 Jews. To make matters worse a large majority of these Jews were executed by their compatriots. This is something that occurred in a number of eastern European countries, however, it was the large scale of collaboration that occurred in the Baltic States that has made its situation somewhat unique.
Although this narrative of how the occupation played out in the Baltic States has been solidified in historiography, there are a number of issues that continue to prompt debate among historians. Upon surveying the relevant literature, one can see that there are three prominent issues that historians are discussing. These include the ‘Double Genocide’ theory, the interregnum period theory, and the implementation of the Holocaust in Estonia. One of the reasons that these issues are being widely discussed is due to the political implications that they have in the modern day. These implications will be discussed further throughout this essay. The aim of this essay is to create a comprehensive understanding of each of these issues. In order to achieve this, the current understanding of each issue will be addressed before each side of argument is analysed. This analysis will involve assessing the accuracy of the argument by researching whether there is evidence to support it points. Once all of this is achieved, this essay will finish with a conclusion that summarises and explains its findings.
Holocaust obfuscation is an issue that has prompted serious discussion in both the historical and Jewish communities. In the case of the Baltics, Holocaust obfuscation is centred on what is known as the ‘Double Genocide’ theory. In its simplest definition, the theory equates the Soviet crimes that occurred in the 1940s to the crimes committed during the Baltic Holocaust. The Baltic populations and their governments are those who have supposedly developed and argued the theory’s accuracy. Those who argue against it suggest that comparing the crimes of each regime to one another is disrespectful and impossible, and that referring to the Soviet crimes as genocide is a distortion of historical truth. They also state that it is one of the latest forms of Holocaust denial. In order to create a better understanding of the issue, the following paragraphs will attempt to assess the legitimacy of the ‘Double Genocide’ theory through a three-step process. The first step involves explaining the crimes committed during each occupation. Secondly, a universal term for genocide that explains whether it is correct to use such a term in these circumstances must be found. After these two step, an analysis of both sets of crimes can take place to see if any sort of comparison can be made.
As stated, the first step is to explain the crimes committed by both the Soviets and the Nazis. The first Soviet occupation is a sensible place to start as it marked the start of a series of occupations of the Baltic States which were to last more than half a decade. Commonly known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty was signed in August 1939 and marked the start of the end for Baltic national autonomy as it, although inexplicitly, effectively surrendered these states to the Soviets. The ‘Orzel incident’ was the Soviet Union’s key to invading Estonia, as they claimed that the Estonians had allowed the Polish submarine to enter the Baltic Sea and, therefore, they were not acting neutral in the war. 25,000 Soviet troops were stationed in Estonia by late September 1939. Attention then turned to Latvia, who caved in to Soviet pressure in early October allowing 30,000 Soviet troops to move into the country. Although a more complex situation unfolded in Lithuania, the Soviets managed to pressure the Lithuanians to favour a Soviet influence over a German one by 8 October 1939. As a result, Vilnius was returned to Lithuania and 20,000 Soviet troops were deployed into the country. From late 1939 to early 1940, the Soviet influence in the Baltic States was rather calm while their focus lay in Finland. Political activity only increased in February 1940 as Stalin wished to gain greater control over the area. This was to be achieved through a policy of pitting ethnic communities against one another. In Lithuania, June 1940, Soviet-instigated anti-communist incidents allowed the Soviets the opportunity to justify a full occupation. Latvia and Estonia, with no hope of defeating a Soviet army, succumbed soon after they received their subsequent ultimatums.
The ‘year of terror’ that unfolded in the Baltic States began with a complete takeover of the Baltic governments. The majority of senior officials, both civilian and military, lost their jobs and were replaced by those who harboured leftist sympathies. Elections were then held and citizens were heavily pressured to vote. However, the result of these elections were forgone conclusions with communist candidates receiving over 92% of the vote in each country. Full-scale Sovietisation followed as the nationalisation of private firms took place. With their government and vote taken from them, and with their economic infrastructure drastically modified, it is clear that the Balts lost almost all of their democratic liberties during the Soviet occupation. However, these losses, although serious, pale into insignificance when compared to the physical crimes that occurred under the Soviet regime. It is primarily these events that the Balts have been reported to have claimed are comparable to the Baltic Holocaust. Andrejs Plakans explains that in the eleven months after June 1940 thousands were imprisoned, executed or deported. He adds that on 14 June 1941 these number spiked across the Baltics with 15,424 Latvians, 18,000 Lithuanians and 10,000 Estonians being ‘removed’ from the population in those two days alone. One must point out that Plakans either doesn’t know or is unclear on the proportion of deportations to executions. Other historians disclose similar numbers including David Jacobs who states that 21,000 Latvian Jews were deported in the few weeks before the German invasion. Timothy Snyder explains that of the 17,000 Lithuanians taken on the 14 June 1941, less than 6,000 eventually returned home. It is also worth mentioning that in addition to the approximate 50,000 Balts that were deported from 1940-41, 150,000 men, women and children were deported, and some executed, from 1944-1949.
The 1940s were a period that the Baltic people will never forget, whether it be for their own sufferings or for remembering the sufferings of the ethnic Jews in the Baltic States. Although a number of Jews suffered during the Soviet occupations, the majority of their suffering occurred during the Nazi occupation from June 1941 to July 1944. Whether the persecutions started prior to the German invasion will be discussed later in this essay, however, it is known that upon invasion mass executions took place across the Baltic States. The mass executions that occurred from June to December 1941 was the first of three phases of the persecution of the Jews. It involved local pogroms in which ethnic Balts were heavily involved in the assaulting and murdering of Jews as well as a looting and burning of their property. More tragically it involved tens of thousands of Jews being murdered at designated death sites such as that at Ponary Forest, Lithuania where a total of 72,000 were killed. The second phase was from January 1942 to March 1943 and involved the ghettoisation of remaining Jews. For example, in Riga, 32,000 were sealed in ghettos.  The third phase saw the liquidation of the ghettos and the final executions of as many Jews as possible until the German retreat in the summer of 1944. As previously mentioned, the total number of Jews executed by the Nazis and their Baltic collaborators numbered close to 246,000. This figure has been calculated using data from Don Levin’s work which explains that 963 Estonian Jews were killed, from Thomas Lane’s work which states that approximately 175,000 Lithuanian Jews were killed and from Timothy Snyder’s work which states that close to 70,000 Latvian Jews lost their lives.
With each set of crimes now explained, a universally agreed definition of genocide can be sourced in order to assess whether or not the term is fitting for both events. The term genocide was coined in the 1940s by Polish lawyer Rafał Lemkin who created the word from genos, the Greek word for race or tribe, and cide, which in Latin translates to killing. Lemkin defined it as ‘the coordinated and planned annihilation of a national, religious or racial group by a variety of actions aimed at undermining the foundations essential to the survival of the group as a group’. With his backing, genocide was later defined in Article II of the United Nations’ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and this has become a universal definition. Here it is defined as,
‘any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group’.
When reading this definition, one may interpret it as evidence that the Soviet crimes were genocide. A significant number of ethnic Balts were killed, mental harm undoubtedly took place when tens of thousands of families lost their loved ones to deportations, and children were forcibly transferred to other areas. The fact that the definition defines genocide as any act that involves any of these crimes, and that the Soviets committed at least three of these, strengthens their argument. Lemkin’s initial definition may also be interpreted as similar evidence, if to a lesser degree. The deportations and deaths had some effect on the ability of the Balts to survive as group. When based on these definitions, as well as others, the suffering that the Balts endured under the Soviet rule may be deemed as genocide. David Hawk, Timothy Snyder and Prit Buttar makes some interesting points that agree with this essay’s conclusion. Hawk explains that genocide should be based on these five characteristics, but should also include political groups in its coverage. This would allow other mass killings, for example the killing of 500,000 Indonesian communists in 1965-66, to be legally seen as genocide. Snyder agrees stating that the Soviet induced famines in Ukraine in the 1930s, in which an estimated 3,300,000 Ukrainians were starved to death, would be deemed as genocide in this case. He adds further that Lemkin himself described the event as ‘the classic example of Soviet genocide’. Buttar explains the drastic impact the Soviets had on the demographic of the Baltic States. He states that by the time the Soviets had departed in 1941, 60,000 Estonians, 35,000 Latvians and 34,000 Lithuanians had left the area as either a result of deportations or from a fear of persecution. Therefore, this could be argued as a Soviet attempt to bring about the destruction of ethnic Balts and would fit the definition of genocide.
As we know, some would disagree that the Soviet crimes in the Baltic states deserve to be termed as genocide. For example, journalist Jonathan Freedland argues that the oppression of the Soviet years was terrible, but it was not genocide. He states that to be arrested is not to be shot into a pit and to say the Baltic experienced genocide is to rob the word of all meaning. Dovid Katz, the leading Western Jewish activist against the ‘Double Genocide’ theory agrees stating that there was only one genocide that occurred in Eastern Europe, the Holocaust. While I understand both Katz’s and Freedland’s side, I disagree with their conclusions. I believe that they place too much emphasis on the word that is genocide in defining the Holocaust, and that they believe that calling both crimes genocide puts each set of crimes on par with one another. I understand the dangers that this may have in the current political climate in the Baltic States, as ultranationalists may manipulate the term in order to alleviate Baltic collaborators of their crimes. Therefore, I must insist that it is historically incorrect to compare genocides to one another, or to justify genocide by equating it to another. What happened to ethnic Jews in the Baltic States cannot be equated to what happened to ethnic Balts during the Soviet occupations. The unprecedented and, so far, unrepeated characteristics of the Holocaust make it horrifyingly unique.. In terms of numbers, hundreds of thousands more Jews were killed by the Nazis and their Baltic collaborators than those killed by the Soviets. The Nazis managed to exterminate over 95% of all Jews in the countries, the highest percentage in all of Eastern Europe. The specialist killing squads, the concentration camps and ghettoes, and the armed anti-Semitic brigades enrolling local policemen and civilian volunteers are just some examples.
The interregnum period that occurred in the final period of the Soviet occupation has divided historical opinion. It has been described as the chaotic period between the Soviet evacuation of Latvia and the establishment of Nazi rule. The debate on the topic lies in how long the period was, with some saying that it was only a matter of hours to two days while others argue it ranged from a few days to a couple of weeks depending on where is being addressed. The significance of the debate lies in the argument that a longer period could mean that the Baltic populations had organised and participated in anti-Semitic pogroms before the Nazis had taken control. On the other hand, a shorter period would suggest that the Balts only took part in such pogroms under the guidance of the Nazis and after they had been induced to do so. When looking at the current political climate in the Baltics, one can see that concluding a shorter period could be potentially fuel the argument that the Balts were coerced into participating in such pogroms, which in turn could be used to alleviate some of the blame that they have received for collaborating in the Baltic Holocaust. While it may not fuel such an argument, it is still important that a current understanding of the topic be created.
The most commonly referenced study when arguing that a short period existed is Andrievs Ezargailis’ work, The Holocaust in Latvia. Ezargailis states that no conclusive evidence has been found to support claims that an interregnum period existed. He believes that in Bauska, a town in Latvia, the period lasted no longer than thirty minutes and that in most other cases it was only a day or two. In fact, it would appear that the majority of Latvian historians agree with Ezargailis. Artis Pabriks and Aldis Purs concur, stating that Soviet control was complete up to the final hours, and that Nazi rule immediately secured all independent armed forces. Valters Nollendorfs also agrees, arguing that there was no ‘Germanless Holocaust’ and that the very brief interregnum was not marked by mass retributions against Jews. Didzis Bērzinš goes as far to say that the interregnum period and its resulting implications have been propagated by Russian historians. Referencing the argument of Boris Sokolov, Bērzinš states that the Russians have tried to falsify history by decreasing the importance of Soviet repressions while they exaggerate the role of local collaborators in the crimes committed by the Nazis.
Inesis Feldmanis, agrees with his fellow compatriots that no Latvian driven pogroms occurred in this interregnum period, however, in a less extreme view, he argues that the period typically lasted between two days to a couple of weeks. He references the work of Juris Pavlovičs, a specialist in the topic, who agrees on this time frame as well as stating that the only thing that the local Latvia population wanted, having just survived the June repressions and the horrors of the Soviet regime, was to save their lives and property. Pavlovičs insists that the majority of the population that were active in the period were too busy participating in partisan activities to persecute personally disliked compatriots.
While it is difficult to find primary evidence to either prove or disprove what these historians are saying, there are a couple of points that should be considered when attempting to understand the interregnum. The first is that it would appear that none of the leading American or western European secondary literature have commented on the interregnum debate in any of the relevant works that discuss the Holocaust in Latvia. Even in reviews of Ezargailis’ ground breaking publication on this topic, there is again no mention of the interregnum or the debate surrounding it. This lack of discussion could be for a number of reasons. One could be that no western historians have chosen to investigate the findings of the Latvian historians and so they have chosen to take such at face value. A second could be that they have investigated their findings and have simply agreed with them. While another could be that they have chosen to avoid investigating the issue, or have investigated it and chosen not to publish their argument for political reasons. These reasons could relate to the implications that showing a non-induced Latvian persecution of the Jews would have in the historical narrative of Latvia. This is obviously a substantial claim, but these are the questions that historians should be asking when revisiting issues in history. After all, Ezergailis’ book was published over twenty years ago, only five years after Latvia had achieved independence and in a post-Cold-War United States of America which would not want to fuel any Russian propaganda.
The second point relates to the pogroms that occurred in Lithuania. Jonathan Freedland states that the Lithuanians were killing Jews on 22 June 1941, well before the Einsatzgruppen had induced them into doing so. Prit Buttar references a local farmer in the Lithuanian town of Plungė who remarked that, The Germans only have to cross the border, and on the same day we will wade in the blood of Jews in Plungė’. Therefore, in Lithuania, it would appear that the persecution and killings of Jews started during the interregnum period, which makes it more difficult to answer why the same did not happen in Latvia. Anti-Semitic views were held deeply in both states, they both participated in later pogroms and many citizens in each nation wanted to extract revenge on the Judeo-Bolshevik regime that they believed they had lived under for the past year. However, while these points should be considered, they can only be considered historically accurate if relevant primary materials are found to agree with them. The only way that this could occur would be through an accurate revision of the topic that had access to such materials. Until this can happen, the status quo of the interregnum will be maintained.
The final subject that this essay will attempt to address is the differences in the process of the Holocaust in Estonia. The Estonian case was unique to both Lithuania and Latvia as well as all other Eastern European countries. There were no ghettos, anti-Semitic pogroms, or any death squads staffed by natives, like the Arājs Commando in Latvia or the Hamann Commando in Lithuania. There was also a supposed lack of public knowledge of the atrocities that were occurring during the Nazi occupation. In recent times, these two characteristics of the Estonian Holocaust have been used as evidence to support the claim that the Holocaust runs counter to the national historical narrative, and that the event is a superimposed discourse that has no direct connection to their country. This narrative would also argue that the Jews have unfairly claimed the main victim status of occupied Estonia, and that this should be reserved for the entire Estonian population.
In order to understand the accuracy of this narrative, these characteristics should be analysed while also addressing others that may counter their points. If we first look at why no pogroms existed, Snyder has argued that pogroms were not instigated by the Nazis in Estonia as they had realised that they were no longer an effective recruitment tool. Instead, he argues that the Nazis chose to simply tell the Estonians that the would only be offered a form of national autonomy if they participated in the atrocities against the Jews. In terms of ghettos, it can be argued that none were required due to the small number of Jews that still lived in the country. Due to strong Soviet resistance, two thirds of the Jewish population were able to flee to Russia prior to Nazi takeover in July 1941. It meant that only around 1,000 were left in Estonia a number that, through quick executions, would not require ghettos. This may also explain why no death squads were required as according to Nazi officer Franz Walter, Einsatzgruppe A, with help from Estonian collaborators, were able to kill all Estonian Jews by December 1941 and declare the country ‘Judenfrei’. While one could argue that this short period of executions could help justify the claim that there was a lack of public knowledge of the atrocities, there is plenty evidence to argue the contrary. Estonian Jews made up just over ten percent of the total number of Jewish deaths in Estonia. Polish, Lithuanian, Czechoslovakian, Soviet and other Jews covered the other ninety percent. With more than 8,500 Jews being murdered from 1941-1944, it is more difficult to argue that the Estonians were unaware. However, Ruth Bettina-Birn gives an example that insists that this was the case. According to a German pastor, who was a member of the Bekennende Kirche and was stationed in Estonia, nobody whom he asked in Estonia had ever heard anything about the murder of Jews, despite his insistence on obtaining knowledge about the atrocities. While a number of factors could have influenced this example, including how many people the pastor asked, who he asked and so on, it is still a primary source and should be taken seriously given the scarce number of sources available on this topic. Although highly unlikely, if this source is representative of the whole Estonian public, it could be used to argue that the majority of Estonians were oblivious to the Holocaust that was occurring in their country. Nevertheless, this does not justify claims that Jews claiming the primary victim status in occupied Estonia is unfair. While the Holocaust was unique in Estonia, it must be understood in the context of the Holocaust as a whole. The systematic murder of Estonian Jews was part of a genocide that was, and still is, unequivocal in scale. Therefore, it is essential that historians, in particular those of Baltic nationality, explain the importance of this wider context to anyone who attempts to argue the event in a national context.
In conclusion, this study has attempted to create a greater understanding of three of the most pressing issues regarding the Baltic Holocaust. The current understanding of each issue was explained before an analysis of each debate could take place. The aim of this analysis was to the examine the accuracy of each argument, and in order to achieve this aim, both the evidence that supports the argument as well as the evidence that contradicts it were explained. In the case of the ‘Double Genocide’ theory, this study has concluded that allowing the Soviet crimes in the 1940s to be termed as genocide is justified. The suffering that occurred during these occupations fits the definition that seems to be universally accepted. However, any argument that compares to Holocaust to any other genocide or historical event is completely unjustified. The Holocaust is a horrifyingly unique event that should not be obfuscated by comparing it to any other genocide.
With regards to the interregnum period in Latvia, it can be concluded that the turnover from Soviet rule to Nazi rule was anywhere between a couple of days to a couple of weeks depending on the area. Unfortunately, knowing this time frame provides little evidence when trying to understand if pogroms took place in Latvia before the Germans took control. It only proves that it was possible that pogroms could have taken place. The argument that because it happened in Lithuania it could have happened in Latvia has similar limitations. The counter argument that Latvians were ‘too busy’ to persecute the Jews, however, would appear just as inconclusive.  Yet, until it can be proven otherwise, this unconvincing narrative on the subject will remain intact. Therefore, this study has concluded that the only way to create a better understanding of the subject is for an in-depth revision of the issue to take place. While all professional historians are meant to be impartial to everything they research, it may be beneficial if this revision take place by a non-Baltic national with no political motives. This is obviously easier said than done as every historian has their individual conscious and subconscious biases.
With regards to the implementation of the Holocaust in Estonia, the lack of pogroms can be attributed to a change in Nazi policy. This argument appears credible, as it has been argued that the Estonian persecution of Jews was driven by politics rather than driven by pure racial hatred. However, in order to believe in this explanation, one must believe that the pogroms were instigated and employed entirely by the Nazis. Therefore, its accuracy depends on an issue that some historians would disagree with. A more concrete conclusion can be made for the lack of ghettos as the small number of Jews in Estonia meant the Nazis were capable of quickly executing all local Jews. In terms of public knowledge, it is extremely difficult to know what every Estonian knew or did not know. If a greater understanding of the issue it to occur, more primary sources, like the example of the German pastor, will need to be uncovered. Overall, while this study has attempted to create a greater understanding of the topic, it is evident that the Baltic Holocaust is a part of history that will continue to require more research, analysis and discussion.
 Dovid Katz, ‘The Double Genocide Theory’, Jewish Currents, (22 November 2017) https://jewishcurrents.org/the-double-genocide-theory/ (Accessed 13 November 2019)
 The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty (23 August 1939)
 P. Buttar, Between Giants: The Battle for the Baltics in World War II (New York, 2015), 53.
 Ibid, 35.
 T. Snyder, Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning (London, 2015), 138.
 Buttar, Between Giants, 37.
 A. Plakans, A Concise History of the Baltic States (Cambridge 2011), 350.
 Ibid, 343.
 R. Misiunas and R. Taagepera, The Baltic States, Years of Dependence 1940-1990 (London, 1993), 28.
 Plakans, Concise, 347.
 David Jacobs, ‘Baltic States Collections at the Hoover Institution Archives’ (2003), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/library/docs/baltic_states_guide_english-1.pdf
(Accessed 17 October 2019)
 Snyder, Black Earth, 142.
 Andrew Higgins, ‘Nazi Collaborator of National Hero? A Test for Lithuania’, New York Times (September 10, 2018)
 T. Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (London, 2010), 192.
 Ibid, 193.
 D. Levin, ‘Lithuania’ in I Gutman (ed.) Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, 3 (New York, 1990), 895
 T. Lane, Lithuania Stepping Westward (2001), 58.
 Snyder, Bloodlands, 193.
 F. Chalk, ‘‘Genocide in the 20th Century’ Definitions of Genocide and their implications for prediction and prevention’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 4, 2 (1989), 149.
 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948)
 K. Jonassohn and F. Chalk, ‘A Typology of Genocide and Some Implications for the Human Rights Agenda’, Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death, 3, 4 (1987), 17.
 Snyder, Bloodlands, 53.
 Buttar, Between Giants, 48.
 Jonathan Freedland, ‘I see why ‘double genocide’ is a term Lithuanians want. But it appals me’, The Guardian (14 September 2010)
 Timothy Snyder, ‘The fatal fact of the Nazi-Soviet pact’, The Guardian (5 October 2010)
 Y. Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, (New Haven, 2001), 50.
 Dovid Katz, ‘The Double Genocide Theory’, Jewish Currents, (22 November 2017) https://jewishcurrents.org/the-double-genocide-theory/ (Accessed 13 November 2019)
 F. Chalk, ‘‘Genocide in the 20th Century’ Definitions of Genocide and their implications for prediction and prevention’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 4, 2 (1989), 150.
 Inesis Feldmanis, ‘The Latvian Legion: the Most Topical Research Problems’ (2014) https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/stockholm/bilateral-relations-of-latvia-and-sweden/the-latvian-legion-the-most-topical-research-problems (Accessed 5 November 2019)
 A. Ezargailis, The Holocaust in Latvia, 1941-1944: The Missing Center (Riga, 1996)
 I. Feldmanis, ‘Latvia under the Occupation of National Socialist Germany 1941–1945’ in V. Nollendorfs V. and E. Oberlander (ed.) The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations 1940-1991 (Riga, 2005), 82.
 A. Pabriks and A. Purs, Latvia: The Challenges of Change (London, 2001), 28.
 Nollendorfs, V. and Oberlander, E. (eds), The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations I940-I99I: Selected Research of the Commission of the Historians of Latvia (Riga, 2005), 13.
 D. Berzins, ‘Holocaust Historiography in Latvia: the Road toward Research Infrastructure’, Dapim: Studies on the Holocaust, 31, 3 (2017), 283.
 Feldmanis, Latvia under the Occupation, 82.
 J. Pavlovičs, ‘Change of Occupation Powers in Latvia in Summer 1941: Experience of Small Communities’ in V. Nollendorfs V. and E. Oberlander (ed.) The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations 1940-1991 (Riga, 2005), 98.
 Ibid, 99.
 J. D. Klier, ‘The Holocaust in Latvia 1941-1944: The Missing Centre, Ezergailis’, Slavic Review, 56, 4 (1997), 775.
 Freedland, ‘I see why ‘double genocide’’.
 Buttar, Between Giants, 103.
 A. Weiss-Wendt, ‘Why the Holocaust Does Not Matter to Estonians’, Journal of Baltic Studies, 39, 4 (2008), 476.
 Ibid, 475.
 Ibid, 492.
 Snyder, Black Earth, 214.
 A. Purs, Baltic Facades: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 1945 (London, 2012), 56.
 R. Bettina Birn, ‘Collaboration with Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe: The Case of the Estonian Security Police’, Contemporary European History, 10, 2 (2001), 188.
 Pavlovičs, ‘Change of Occupation’, 99.
 Bettina Birn, ‘Collaboration with Nazi Germany’, 189.